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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1027 
___________ 
 
CLARENCE C. HOUSER, JR., 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01024) 
District Judge:  Honorable Magistrate Judge Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 25, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 28, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Clarence C. Houser, Jr., appeals from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss his complaint (the “second lawsuit”).  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
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 Houser was formerly employed by the United States Postal Service.  In 2009, 
while still employed, Houser filed a lawsuit (the “first lawsuit”) against the Postmaster 
General (“the Defendant”), alleging that the Defendant discriminated against him and 
retaliated against him based on injuries he incurred in August 2007 and April 2008.  The 
District Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Houser’s claims of age 
discrimination, slander, and retaliation, but allowed his claims under the Rehabilitation 
Act to proceed.  The District Court later granted Defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims, finding that Houser did not suffer from a 
“disability” as defined in the Act, and that he failed to show that the Defendant required 
him to perform work beyond his medical restrictions.  Houser did not appeal. 
 Four months after he filed the first lawsuit, Houser was terminated from his 
position for “willful misconduct” and violations of work rules.  In July 2012, a little over 
three years later, Houser filed this second lawsuit.  Houser filed an original complaint, 
two amended complaints, and other motions and responses containing factual allegations 
and statutory citations.  The District Court generously considered all of Houser’s filings, 
despite their procedural shortcomings, in granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss.1  
Applying plenary review, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 
2008), we find no error in the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
1
  The original complaint consisted of two sentences, with an attached May 23, 2012 
decision from the United States EEOC, Office of Federal Operations, denying Houser’s 
motion for reconsideration of its October 25, 2011 decision.  The First Amended 
complaint contained two paragraphs; the Second Amended Complaint consisted of two 
pages.  Houser’s subsequent filings continued to add claims and name additional federal 
statutes that he believed had been violated.   
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 We agree with the District Court that many of Houser’s claims are barred by res 
judicata, as they were raised, or could have been raised, in the first lawsuit.  See 
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).  We further agree, 
nonetheless, that Houser’s filings consist of (1) claims that are untimely, e.g., (a) his 
claims under the Family Medical Leave Act; see 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1) & (2); see also 
Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 739-40 (2003), (b) his claims of a 
violation of the labor agreement with the National Association of Letter Carriers 
(“NALC”), see DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983); (2) 
claims that are unexhausted, e.g., his claims of disability discrimination, see Wilson v. 
MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2007); or (3) allegations that otherwise fail to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, e.g., his claims referring to “color of 
law,” “the Whistle Blower Act,” OSHA, and FELA (no allegations in his filings relate to 
these statutes); his age discrimination and retaliation claims (the pleadings do not make 
any reference to allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would 
reveal that he was treated differently because of his age, nor that he engaged in any 
protected activity that resulted in retaliation), see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 
2006); and his claims of a violation of the agreement with the NALC (filings contain no 
allegation of a breach of duty by union), see generally 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b); see also 
Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 914 (7
th
 Cir. 2013).
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  “Although 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) grants federal courts jurisdiction [over] disputes 
arising under collective bargaining agreements executed by the [Postal Service], § 
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 For essentially the same reasons cited by the District Court, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.3 
                                                                                                                                                  
1208(b) is the analogue to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and 
the law under § 301 is fully applicable to suits brought under § 1208(b).”  See Gibson v. 
United States Postal Serv., 380 F.3d 886, 889 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 
3
  Houser filed a “Supplemental Brief” in our Court without seeking leave to do so.  
We have received it for our information only, but note that the arguments contained 
therein make no difference to our decision, as they do not change our conclusion that his 
FMLA claims were untimely and that he failed to state a claim with regard to any 
discrimination claims. 
